RE CURBS ON LIFETIME FACULTY POSTS


             Discussions in Japan for curbing lifetime faculty posts were

        reported in the 15 March, 1996 Science.  The choice need not be

        between only lifetime tenure and limited-time appointments,

        however.  Among other possibilities, here is a scheme for easing

        the universities' problem of tenure held by faculty members whose

        productivity is relatively low, by having such professors

        "voluntarily" receive less money than otherwise -- that is, by

        self-selection.

             Each faculty member tenured at the time of initiation of the

        plan would be offered:  Option 1 -- Retain tenure, give up the

        franchise to vote on new hires, and expect (depending on

        university policy) either a) zero salary increases, or b) just an

        inflation-adjustment, or c) only some modest fixed percentage

        increase each year.  Option 2 -- Forswear tenure and accept a

        rolling, fixed-term contract (RFC) for perhaps eight or ten or

        twelve years.

             Some additional details:  1) The same choice would be

        offered to a faculty member when newly offered tenure.  2) At any

        future time, a faculty member could join the RFC track at a

        negotiated salary.  3) Renegotiation of a tenured professor's

        salary could take place upon receipt of an outside offer or a

        threat to quit for other reasons, just as at present.

             Please notice that each person's situation would be chosen

        voluntarily.  No faculty member would be required to give up

        tenure.  The scheme does lead to lower salaries for tenured

        persons than under the present system, and those persons

        therefore would not choose either of the options in comparison to

        their present situations.  But such an imposed change in market

        conditions is not at all inconsistent with the notion of

        voluntary choice in this context, I believe, or with existing

        tenure contracts.  And the change is no more inequitable than any

        other market alteration that moves toward a better match of price

        paid and market price.

             The scheme has two beneficial results from the point of view

        of the university:  1) The salary bill for presently-tenured non-

        productive faculty members would be reduced.  2) Hiring decisions

        would be made by those faculty members who have less to fear on

        average from new hires than would the average of all presently-

        tenured faculty in the absence of tenure, because only the more

        productive professors would opt for the RFC contract.

        Additionally, one would expect those who choose RFC to have more

        to gain from the presence of talented newcomers than those who do

        not choose RFC.  Hence this scheme would lead to higher-caliber

        hiring than a non-tenure system which would include all

        presently-tenured faculty members.

             Lest the present scheme seem "indecent" or an impossibly-

        radical break with present practice, one might notice that two-

        track schemes -- one track for the bulk of faculty, and the other

        track for "teachers" only -- have been adopted at such respected

        institutions as Hebrew University.

             The scheme is described in more detail in Simon (1991).

                                           Julian L. Simon



                                REFERENCE

             Simon, Julian L., "A Solution for the Tenure Problem," Cato

        Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter, 1991, pp. 835-838.


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